Read Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant Paul Guyer Allen W. Wood Online


Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Riga: J. F. Hartknoch, 1781), 856 pp. 2nd (B) ed: 1787. [A-edition (Ak. 4:5-252); B-edition (Ak. 3:2-552)]. “Critique of Pure Reason.” Translated by Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan 1929). Translated by Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett 1996). Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, edited by Paul GuyKritik der reinen Vernunft (Riga: J. F. Hartknoch, 1781), 856 pp. 2nd (B) ed: 1787. [A-edition (Ak. 4:5-252); B-edition (Ak. 3:2-552)]. “Critique of Pure Reason.” Translated by Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan 1929). Translated by Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett 1996). Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1997).“In the current Easter book fair there will appear a book of mine, entitled Critique of Pure Reason [...] This book contains the result of all the varied investigations that start from the concepts we debated together under the heading mundi sensibilis and mundi intelligibilis.” — thus begins Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz from 1 May 1781 (Ak. 10:266).Kant’s own copy of this book was housed at the Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Königsberg, before being lost in 1945. Fortunately Kant’s marginalia had already been printed at Ak. 23:17-50, as well as in Erdmann [1881]; they are also included in the Guyer/Wood translation....

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Critique of Pure Reason Reviews

  • David
    2019-01-10 21:04

    Immanuel Kant is the kind of guy who not only sucks all of the joy out of life; he takes great pleasure in opening the spigot of your happiness-tank and watching it all spill out onto the burn-out lawn and sink into the earth -- seeping toward the planet's molten, pitiless core and, thereupon, toward its irrevocable dissipation. If he were alive today, I suggest to you that Kant's corporeal manifestation would be that of a paunchy, balding man, eternally sixty years old, who is often seen in his yard, cleaning out his gutters or basement wells or tending his garden joylessly. He's perhaps wearing a modified pith helmet and too-tight khaki shorts which reveal the topography of his bunchy twill underpants as he crouches to slake the thirst of his prized marigolds. Of course, his plastic eyeglass frames are a mottled brown -- no, not tortoise-shell, but a harsh two-tone pattern reminiscent of the formica customarily surrounding a late 1970s basement wet bar. Additionally, the lenses are several sizes too large to conform to even the most deluded strictures of fashion. His socks (or 'stockings,' as he calls them) are a heavy, nauseous tan, ribbed but slouchy. A stubborn elastic band around the stockings' crown tries to hold them steadily around the mid-calf, but the up-again, down-again athleticism of gardening forbids this vain hold-out against gravity. Consequently, the stockings occasionally puddle around his knobby ankles. But not for long. He grunts, squats, hoists -- grunts, squats, hoists. If the ritual's speed were only increased and set to an uptempo adult contemporary favorite, we might suspect it was a dance. Or else an elaborate tic. Next we should discuss his legs, shouldn't we? Necessity seems to demand it... Kant's legs -- when both his safari-aspirational shorts and his stockings are performing optimally -- are visible from the mid-thigh to the mid-calf and are fantastically white and nearly hairless. It's the kind of white that shames even the newest-fallen snow, and the kind of hairlessness that visits certain men at an advancing age. It's almost as if the sproutings of those once-masculine hairs had wearied over time and just surrendered the puttering gardener to a pleasant sexual neutrality. His legs, otherwise, are surprisingly bulbous with muscle at the height of the calf: a cleft, spastic musculature, as in the shape of cloven hooves. His sandals are wide and deep brown about the straps (three straps in total, none crossed or set at provocative angles), and vaguely semitic in design -- which is to say, tough as citrus rinds, in order to deflect the cruelties of the Negev. This is what Immanuel Kant would look like today, probably. If he were your neighbor (a half dozen houses down the street, perhaps) and you were driving to your vinyl-sided ranch or bungalow with a sackful of perishable groceries in the trunk of your Volvo S40, and if you tapped the horn friskily and waved at Mr. Kant as he dug in his garden, he would, I assure you, remain defiantly crouched, folded in upon himself, beholden to some faithless prayer. He would seem as if to have not heard your car or your horn and neither to have suspected your hand were raised in salutation. But of course he is nothing else but an intelligent man, and so he hears and of course he knows, or at least suspects. But he simply straightens his sun-bleached helmet, sinks his fingers more deeply into his yellow suede work gloves, and digs toward an object which will bring him no joy or satisfaction, but rather a steady, textureless hum within and throughout his consciousness which passes in some muddled cultures for the noise of enlightenment.

  • Manny
    2018-12-27 01:22

    ThesisTurgid, dogmatic, overrated and well past its sell-by.ProofAs Einstein exasperatedly said: if Kant had only been able to stop pontificating about the nature of time and space, he might actually have discovered something interesting about them. Einstein, with considerable justification, felt that he had refuted Kant, and was surprised to find that philosophers were reluctant to accept his claim. To me, it seems clear-cut. Kant repeatedly tells us that time and space are not things; but Einstein's insight is that this is wrong. Space-time is, indeed, a thing that we can roughly conceptualize as a kind of invisible fluid in which we have our physical being. Matter acts on space-time to change its shape, and space-time acts on matter to cause it to move. This interplay between space-time and matter is what we experience as gravity.Einstein has done far more than correct a detail. The most obvious consequence is that the greater part of the Antinomy of Pure Reason - a good hundred pages of Kant's book - is rendered invalid. Kant argues, roughly, that it is not meaningful to inquire about whether the universe is finite or infinite in space and time. The fact that time and space are things radically changes the situation. Contrary to Kant's claims, the whole of space-time is now also a thing. The question of whether it is finite or infinite turns out to be related to its curvature, which is something we can measure. Thus the finiteness of the universe is part of the world of phenomena, and astronomers during the last few decades have done a great deal of practical work investigating these questions.In the field of literature, Proust was as annoyed as Einstein. The following passage from La prisonnière (presented here with the Scott Moncrief translation) eloquently sums up his feelings:– J’y vais, Madame, j’y vais », finit par dire Brichot comme le général Deltour s’éloignait. Mais d’abord l’universitaire me prit un instant à part : « Le devoir moral, me dit-il, est moins clairement impératif que ne l’enseignent nos Éthiques. Que les cafés théosophiques et les brasseries kantiennes en prennent leur parti, nous ignorons déplorablement la nature du Bien. Moi-même qui, sans nulle vantardise, ai commenté pour mes élèves, en toute innocence, la philosophie du prénommé Emmanuel Kant, je ne vois aucune indication précise, pour le cas de casuistique mondaine devant lequel je suis placé, dans cette critique de la Raison pratique où le grand défroqué du protestantisme platonisa, à la mode de Germanie, pour une Allemagne préhistoriquement sentimentale et aulique, à toutes fins utiles d’un mysticisme poméranien. C’est encore le « Banquet », mais donné cette fois à Kœnigsberg, à la façon de là-bas, indigeste et assaisonné avec choucroute, et sans gigolos.["I am going, Madame, I am going," said Brichot, as General Deltour moved away. But first of all the Professor took me aside for a moment: "Moral Duty," he said, "is less clearly imperative than our Ethics teach us. Whatever the Theosophical cafés and the Kantian beer-houses may say, we are deplorably ignorant of the nature of Good. I myself who, without wishing to boast, have lectured to my pupils, in all innocence, upon the philosophy of the said Immanuel Kant, I can see no precise ruling for the case of social casuistry with which I am now confronted in that Critique of Practical Reason in which the great renegade of Protestantism platonised in the German manner for a Germany prehistorically sentimental and aulic, ringing all the changes of a Pomeranian mysticism. It is still the Symposium, but held this time at Kônigsberg, in the local style, indigestible and reeking of sauerkraut, and without any good-looking boys.]AntithesisA brilliant and incalculably important book which more or less created modern thought.ProofThe difficulty of reconciling the world of sensations with the world of concepts is perhaps the central problem of philosophy. No one, before or since, has done it better than Kant did in the Critique of Pure Reason.I do not think it a coincidence that relativity and quantum mechanics, the great breakthroughs in twentieth century physics, were discovered by German-speaking scientists who were thoroughly acquainted with his work. Einstein's special theory of relativity crucially depends on the insight that different observers experience time and space differently. Lorentz had all the pieces of the jigsaw in front of him, but was unable to put them together into the realization that the "Lorentz contraction" cannot be conceptualized as an objective fact, but is rather observer-dependent. If he had been able to grasp this point, he would have gone down in history as the discoverer.Quantum mechanics is an even clearer case, where the Schrödinger equation is almost a direct translation of Kant's ideas into mathematical form. The unknowable wave-function represents the noumenal world; the world of phenomena is represented by the system of operators which act on it, where the operators themselves are the senses and their eigenvalues are the sense data. Though one point is oddly reversed with respect to Kant. There is the same duality between determinism and free will, but it is the world of noumena that turns out to be deterministic, while the world of phenomena is not!The mark Kant made on literature is only slightly less telling. As I recently discovered in Gautier-Vignal's Proust connu et inconnu, Proust was fascinated by Kant, and the whole of the Recherche greatly influenced by his ideas. I must reread Le temps retrouvé from this new perspective; I suspect that many things which puzzled me first time round will become clearer.

  • Elena
    2019-01-11 01:30

    “...Reason should take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a court of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless pretensions, and this not by mere decrees but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws; and this court is none other than the critique of pure reason itself.” Kant's critical turn shows that the problem of self-knowledge, not metaphysics, is the true subject matter for first philosophy. It shows that it is not metaphysics that can serve as a meta-science, or as the discipline that can critique science in order to discern its underlying logical systematicity; rather, it is the theory of self-knowledge that can perform that function. Kant shows that it is the theory of self-knowledge alone that can identify the logical principles by which we can conceive the unity of knowledge. This is perhaps the basic Kantian insight: knowledge is one because experience is one, and all knowledge is based on principles that are ultimately drawn from the structure of experience. Kant does nothing less in this work than to introduce a new starting point for thought. And yet Kant offers here not “just” another philosophical perspective to set aside all others. It is this that perhaps makes his philosophical intent so notoriously hard to pinpoint. His analysis is not a positive doctrine, so much as an instrument that enables us to take a stance outside and above all positive perspectival stances (in philosophy and beyond), and to place these on a common logical map. This is because his analysis provides us with a means to conceive the logical, structural conditions that ground -any- possible perspective-taking. Wittgenstein's philosophical motto - “I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible buildings” - might just as well apply to Kant. Kant's Critique seeks to explicate, from a first-person (or what he calls a “transcendental” perspective) the structural, a priori principles that make possible the systematic character of experience and of knowledge alike. In this, Kant is a precursor to the phenomenological approach to describing the structure of cognition. This is because, unlike a third-person, empirical, psychological analysis of cognitive structure, Kant's seeks to render explicit the logic of coherent perspective-taking: i.e., the structural principles that must hold if we are to provide a sufficient explanation of the systematic character of experience. Kant starts with the fundamental fact overlooked by past philosophers: the intractable fact of cognitive limitation. He points out that a perspective that seeks to start explanation with metaphysical principles that are deemed primary necessarily begs the most fundamental question: that our finite cognitive apparatus is sufficient to the task of grasping the fundamental principles of a world-independent order of things. Kant's Copernican turn is based on the simple observation that the characteristic structure of our own reason provides us with our only pattern for inferring the structure of the real. For instance, the question we should be starting inquiry with is not whether the world in itself is causally structured. This is because the answer to this question relies on the answer to more fundamental questions still: To what extent are concepts such as cause valid? On which intuitions derived from experience are they grounded? And to which domains do they legitimately apply? The Kantian motto - "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" - introduces a key criterion for evaluating the meaningfulness of concepts: that they be given content from intuitions derived from the sensibility. The attempts of pre-critical metaphysics to use these concepts to describe the mind-independent world fail this Kantian meaningfulness test since in such uses, these concepts cannot be given content by any possible experience. Before attempting a “Theory of Everything,” we must, therefore, map the structure of this finite cognitive system which filters our access to the real. Kant's great epiphany was that it is the constraints placed by the knowledge-construction process that form the most significant factor in determining the shape of any theory of the world. Since our knowledge of the structure of things is constrained more by the structure of thought than it is by the structure of things, we must build our paradigms on the basis of a prior analysis of the structure of thought. Kant's philosophy is structured as a refutation of Hume. Humean skepticism was based on a reductionist analysis of experience which sought to resolve experience into basic “atoms,” and then to reconstruct it from them. This reductionist approach to describing the structure of experience led him to doubt that any of the structural principles of reason, which were expressed in metaphysics (eg, the concepts of necessary causal connection, and of persisting, substantial identity) had any meaning. This led to his notorious inability to explain the systematic structure of experience, except as a loose aggregate of fictions synthesized out of the repeated “conjunction” of sense-impressions, which forms habits of expectation in us. According to Hume, these fiction-based habits alone are the basis of the regularities that our metaphysical principles express.Kant recognized that trashing the presumptuous, question-begging fiction of knowledge as passive reflection of a mind-independent metaphysical order which Hume sought to expose means we can't start with the metaphysical question of identifying the rational principles that best characterize the structure of being. The only possible source for rational foundations left now is the structure of experience. Kant sought to show that Hume's reductionist, empiricist analysis of experience was flawed. His Critique attempts to offer a re-description of the phenomenology of experience that does justice to its systematic unity and continuity, and which can ground the principles of reason. The tragic irony, as Kant argues, is that if Hume's empiricist starting point is correct, the explanatory power of science makes no sense. Science loses all rational grounding. The -fact- of scientific knowledge shows that Hume's understanding of experience is wrong. Kant's first-person, “transcendental method” provides a better starting point from which to describe the principles underlying the unity of experience, which alone make it possible for us to reason scientifically. This method offers us with the means to answer Hume: the perceived “constant conjunction” of events in sense experience can provide us with a knowledge of causal relations because reason is equipped with a priori principles which help structure and organize sense experience, among which is our concept of cause. These a priori principles act as structural conditions for the possibility of all experience. So, it is not that we infer the generalization of causal relation from various sense experiences, as Hume thought; rather, no coherent experience of the world at all could be had without the structuring effected by these formal principles. As conditions for synthesizing sense impressions into a coherent whole, they define the horizon of our possible perspective-taking on the real, and, thus, the limits of our knowledge.The structure of reason conditions our access to reality; it determines what we can register as real. Kant shows how real innovations in geometry, mathematics, science, and logic have only been possible via a constructive method that in effect presupposes the cognitive synthetic a priori principles he describes. Thus, reason has only managed to gain insight into reality when it has, in each of these disciplines, first reflected on its own structure, and then formulated idealizations on the basis of its insight into its own structure which served to regulate its empirical inquiries. One can think of the discovery of the concept of inertia, by postulating the ideal, empirically non-realizable fiction of an absolutely frictionless plane. It is only in reference to such idealizations, postulated by reason as abstract stable reference points, that we can measure and carve up the chaos of reality into an organized, systematic whole. We ourselves supply the structure that phenomena can take for us.Kant's radical insight is that that resultant systematic whole is a function of reason more than it is a function of the structure inhering in phenomena. For while “the material” of sense experience does indeed come from passive perception of the world, via the sensibility, such perception is actively structured from the ground up by the mind: first, via the “pure intuitions” of space and time supplied by the sensibility, which place all sensations onto a spatio-temporal map (for it is Kant's radical contention that we know space and time first as regulative functions of cognition, not as properties of the order of things). All this material is then further structured by being placed in a system of relations via the categories of the understanding, such as cause/effect, substance/mode. Kant thus anticipated the finding of cognitive psychology by two centuries by showing that our knowledge of the order of objects is the product of our cognitive-perceptual filtering. However, he also worked out its full epistemological implications – namely, that we need a new theory of knowledge, an alternative to pre-critical realism, if we are to be true to these facts about cognition.Kant sought to supply a model of reason that makes explicit the structuring principles that determine the form of even the simplest sense experience. The beauty and power of his vision perhaps stems from his manage to gesture to this systematic unity that he believed characterized the mind. He argued that formal logic isn't enough to characterize the unity of reason; rather, a fuller model is needed to capture our full capacity to structure experience. His “transcendental logic” is intended as an alternative to formal logic which doesn't abstract from the content of experience, but rather lays bare the way experience in all its forms is structured by the categories and the synthetic a priori principles. He argues that each discipline, from logic to math to the natural and human sciences, is grounded on the synthetic a priori principles he describes. Philosophy can only become as securely grounded as the sciences are if it manages to accurately characterize the map of these synthetic a priori principles. He believes that reason is “an organic unity,” and that these principles together map this unity. Kant redefines the proper subject matter of metaphysics in formal, logical terms, as the study of the unity of reason, and of the principles that are presupposed by the most unitary perspective we can take on our experience:“Metaphysics... is nothing but the inventory of all we possess through pure reason, ordered systematically. Nothing here can escape us, because what reason brings forth entirely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by reason itself as soon as reason's common principle has been discovered. The perfect unity of this kind of cognition, and the fact that it arises solely out of pure concepts without any influence that would extend or increase it from experience or even particular intuition, which would lead to a determinate experience, make this unconditioned completeness not only feasible but also necessary.”Take-home points: -His most important contribution, IMO, is his notion of the transcendental unity of apperception, which is a condition for the possibility of experience as a systematically-organized, science-generating whole. Any theory of mind that misses this key component will run into contradictions when applied to the task of providing an epistemic justification of science.- Kant refutes formalist accounts of cognition, by showing that concepts are indexed to imaginative constructs that synthesize percepts.-Kant formed the paradigm for the functionalism in terms of which research in modern-day cognitive science is structured. (see: invented the transcendental argument form that provides an alternative to reductionist forms of explanation, which seek to explain experience by abstracting from it its “atomic elements,” and then proceeding to re-construct it as an aggregate of elements. The transcendental argument helps us start with experience, as a given whole, and explain its conditions. -Kant's theory of cognition provides the best refutation of positivism, showing how its criteria of meaning are based on cognitively unrealizable abstraction. For Kant, the whole precedes the parts in cognition. Cognition acts as a systematic whole. Anything that can be given to the mind as either sense datum or fact is identified in relation to the forms of the understanding, which act as a coordinated, systematic whole in structuring any possible experience. Thus, the positivist criterion of meaning, which states that the validity of theoretical constructions must be judged through reference to “hard facts” - is cognitively unrealistic and puts the cart (isolated sense data) before the horse (functioning cognitive systems). -Mapping our cognitive limits helps us know where we have secure grounds to apply those fundamental metaphysical concepts that are integral to the structure of our reason, and where we overstep the bounds of experience and must halt speculation. -These formal limits pre-determine the limits of possible development for both ontology and cosmology. -In the end, we can only have a metaphysics of the experienced world, not of the world in-itself. Perhaps the endless avalanche of interpretations this work has generated is itself a proof of its immense generative power for thought. The critical POV that Kant identified seems to constitute a nodal point for thought from which one can endlessly regenerate philosophy, either through the generation of new systems, or through the critique of historical ones by comparing them to the structural principles of human cognition.Kant's formal analysis is the ultimate generator of methodologies. In the sciences, the Critique also made possible the crucial methodological principle of modern physics, i.e., the now necessary reference to the position of the observer in any formulation of physical law. When Heisenberg states that “What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning,” he is merely summarizing Kant's first critique. After Kant, the structural limitations of perspective become the fundamental factor to contend with in all our empirical theorizing. Kant is also the conceptual architect for what would later become the human, esp cognitive, sciences. It is in his critical turn that these methodologies find their ultimate, rational justification. It also made possible the "perspectivist" turn that lies at the heart of modern artistic practice: in the visual arts, starting at least with the Impressionists, and on to the present moment and traceable through the diverse proliferation of mediums during the last century; in literature, the self-reflexivity we cherish in the modern novel (eg: Proust, Joyce, Woolf). It is ironic that the supposedly austere and unimaginative Kant should become the begetter of whole artistic lineages. In philosophy, he paved the foundations for phenomenology. It might be useful to picture Kant as mapping one end of the continuum of phenomenological description, with Merleau-Ponty sketching the other. At one end one gains a perspective over the universals of logic, mathematics, and the synthetic a priori principles that ground the various disciplines of reason and unite them into a coherent map of human knowledge, and at the other, we have all artistic attempts to push the development of cognitive form to greater concreteness, and thus to increase its “adequacy to experience."Kant plants the seeds for a more radical questioning of reason, seen in Nietzsche and evolutionary epistemology. His relativizing of form to perspective blends well with evolutionary pictures of the organismic nature of the knower. Every species prefers certain arrangements that are conducive to its survival, and “abstracts” its world according to these species-specific preferences. Our characteristic capacity and preference for the kinds of cognitive forms that we have is our signature as a species, and not a fact about the world. There is only a step from here to Nietzsche's radical perspectivism.The critical question concerns the sufficiency of Kant's cognitively-grounded realism. Can you find formal universals at least here, in the mind? Or is this last vestige of universality further deconstructible? If you answer yes to the former, what you're left with is a cognitively-grounded realism. If you answer yes to the latter, you're left in the cul-de-sac of relativism. And if you ignore Kant's critique altogether, as positivism tries to, you risk chasing the shadow cast by your cognitive biases across the cosmos and mistaking these for fundamental ontological principles. One by one, Kant's universals have been relativized. The ideal of “transcendental critique” has been left by the wayside. Instead, all critique nowadays is pursued from historicist assumptions which insist on relativity of forms to context. Historicist analyses point out that Kant's candidates for the a priori structures are really static projections of what were mere features of a Western-specific cognitive mode, and that they were not, as a result, the universal and necessary structural principles of mind that he sought. In support of this would be Kant's importing of Aristotle's categories into his transcendental analysis, thereby bringing cultural bias into the project of identifying the a priori. A further example would be his reliance on the Newtonian paradigm for his formulation of the transcendental forms of space and time, which we now know must be grasped relativistically. This brings up a big problem with the transcendental approach: can we ever identify the a priori on more than a historical basis? We seem to rely, as Kant did, on the thought and science of the day to provide the material for transcendental analysis. Is there any way of filtering out the historical factor and boiling logico-phenomenological analysis down to the real fundamentals? Another strand of critique of Kant comes from embodied mind theorists. In his “Philosophy in the Flesh,” Lakoff argues that empirical findings show the inadequacy of a formal methodology such as Kant's. He claims such an approach lacks the empirical tools required to discern the phenomenologically-inaccessible yet causally efficacious structure of cognitive unconscious mechanisms, which are the true determinants of thought. Such mismatches between first-and third- person analyses of cognitive form lead such theorists to claim that there is a fatal incompleteness in the first-person method for self-understanding.Instead, the first- and third-person pictures of cognitive structure are complementary, and any mismatch between them derives from our insufficient understanding of both. Such third-person theorists are in effect changing the subject. Logic is based on formal principles that are not reducible to neuro-cognitive principles. Consider the difference between making a logical proof and describing the neural structures that might support such proof-making process. In the end, Kant offers the best arguments for why first-person description of the structure of experience has logical primacy in any paradigm.

  • G.R. Reader
    2019-01-22 04:12

    When I was about seven, my favorite movie was Chitty Chitty Bang Bang and Mom was dating this philosophy professor who was writing a book on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. One day, I asked him what it was about, and he told me it was just like Chitty. It was a kind of magic car that - I can still remember his words - "was able to drive on the roads of sensation, float on the water of concepts, and even fly above the sea of transcendental illusion". And then he told me the whole story of Chitty Chitty Bang Bang, with Kant replacing Caractacus Potts and the Critique replacing Chitty. Truly Scrumptious was Modern Science, and Baron Bomburst was some philosopher I'd never heard of who didn't like metaphysics. We all sang the title song together with Mom's boyfriend's words, it started like this:Pure Reason, Critique of Pure ReasonPure Reason, Critique of Pure ReasonPure Reason, Critique of Pure ReasonOh, you, Critique of Pure ReasonCritique of Pure Reason we love youAnd, in, Critique of Pure Reason what we'll do...I can't remember the rest.We all had a great time, and I decided that Kant was my second-favorite philosopher, after Mom's boyfriend. I was sure they were going to get married. And then a week later they had a big fight about synthetic a priori propositions and yelled at each other a lot, and he drove off and we never saw him again. I was very sad about it and told Mom not to be so serious about philosophy in future.I still love that song though.

  • Charissa
    2018-12-30 02:20

    I just Kant stand him.Seriously though... why does so much Western philosophy remind me of arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin? I swear, these gentlemen had their panties wrapped so tightly I don't know how they ever took a proper dump.The problem with Kant (aside from how much he enjoyed listening to the sound of his own voice droning on and on) is that he was irretrievably mired in a Christian world-view, separated from nature, and cursed with the precision of having been brought up German. Poor fellow... he badly needed to run naked through the woods and eat a freshly killed goat around a fire, followed by a proper shag by a woman with enormous tracts of land.

  • Roy Lotz
    2019-01-05 02:07

    It is done. I have finally scaled the sheer surface of this work. It involved continual toil, sweat, and suffering—falling down and picking myself up again. But, when you reach the end, when your eyes finally hit the bottom of that final paragraph, the feeling is momentous. You can stand and look down at the steep drop you managed to climb, and reflect with satisfaction that this mountain is one of the tallest. This is an Everest of a book.That was melodramatic, but only a little. The Critique of Pure Reason is tough, and requires some serious effort to get through. Before attempting it, I would highly recommend first reading Kant’s much shorter Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, in which he summarizes the essential points that are elaborated and ‘proved’ (in his opinion) in this longer work. Additionally, I would recommend any potential readers to acquaint themselves with the philosophy of David Hume (The Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) and Rene Descartes (Meditations on First Philosophy). Thankfully, both writers are more stylish and succinct than Kant.Nevertheless, I think overcoming a book’s reputation for difficulty can often be as challenging as the book itself. It’s sort of like the movie Jaws—you hear the rumors, you see its fin surfacing in the distance, but you never get a good look at the beast until you get down in the water. Thankfully, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has not been known to eat people or destroy nautical vessels. I’m not sure how Kant got his reputation as a horrible writer. Certainly, he is far more turgid than Rousseau, Hume, Descartes, Nietzsche, or even Locke. But, unlike more modern prose disasters like Heidegger, he’s far from unreadable. Roughly on a par with Aristotle, I would say. Above all, the reader must pay close attention to his terminology. Kant is systematic—his goal is a perfect, self-contained whole that comprises every aspect of the universe. Bearing that in mind, one would expect his philosophy to be more dense and verbose than his predecessors. Another way that Kant is unlike some of his forerunners is that he is not a skeptic. He does not begin his investigations by doubting everything he can, but firmly believes in the possibility of human knowledge. Interestingly enough, before writing his three Critiques (which he started in his late fifties), Kant had done some work in the natural sciences, and was quite familiar with Newtonian physics. Being the perceptive man that he was, when Kant read David Hume (who, as Kant says in the Prolegomena, caused him to “awake from his dogmatic slumber”), he realized that Hume’s findings threw the entire scientific endeavor into severe doubt. So at least part of his goal in this work is to save the findings of science.One more tension Kant is trying to resolve is that between scientific explanations and free will. If the world is governed by immutable physical laws that can be described by equations (as Kant believed), how can free will exist? And, finally, what can we know about the universe? If we follow in Newton’s footsteps, can humans figure everything out? And, if so, what would be the consequences for religion?After reading Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (which I would also recommend), Kant perceptively realized that, as human knowledge increases, God will seem less and less likely as an explanation for the natural world. Being a pious Christian, he reacts by attempting to set a firm limit to the reach of human knowledge. This effort, paradoxically, leads Kant to conclude that all metaphysical and logical ‘proofs’ of God’s existence are insufficient, and that humans will never be able to know for sure if there is a God. The upshot of this is that humans will also never by able to disprove God’s existence, leaving room for faith.When I first read this book, I was very taken by his thinking, and found Kant to be a profound genius. Well, I still think he's a profound genius; but now, however, after reading more philosophy and reflecting on Kant’s system, I am somewhat less convinced, and think there are some fatal errors in his reasoning. That being said, nobody can deny that Kant is a superlative philosopher—scrupulous, methodical, fantastically ambitious—and deserves to be read, and read, and read again. After all, one doesn’t read philosophers in order to agree with them. Precisely the reverse.

  • Nathan
    2019-01-15 23:15

    Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason marks what is more or less a beginning of philosophy. It is no longer possible to go back behind his Copernican revolution, as if one could do philosophy without taking into account the subject or consciousness. This turn toward subjectivity is only tightened with the Wittgensteinian and Heideggarian turns toward language. Both naive empiricism (Hume, Locke, etc) and strict rationalism (Leibniz, Wolff, etc) are thoroughly overcome, synthesized if you will. Of course there remain Plato and Aristotle whom we will never be without, but they belong in a sense to an earlier dispensation of thought. And despite advances in the natural sciences, the world in which we live and have our being is Kantian, which is to say, still Euclidian and Newtonian. It is only from this subjective position that we embark upon scientific investigations into nature in general. But of course we will always go back and read and philosophize with those greatest minds. Back to Leibniz and Spinoza (but not Wolff), Locke and Hume, Descartes and his crowd, Aquinas and Augustine along with those countless assembled together as ‘medieval’, without fail to Plato and Aristotle, to Parmenides and Heraclitus. And we will travel to China and India and discover there this same spirit of thought. But in so far as we understand philosophical progress, in so far as we understand philosophical thinking in its historical dimension, something happened with Kant’s critique which cannot be undone. Insofar as all systematic thinking endeavors to overcome a presupposed dualism (viz Descartes’ two substances), it is with Kant that we first see an opening, that “the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.” However one fails to say it, one cannot overemphasize the determinative role of Kant in the history of philosophy, and in the very possibility of philosophy, of thinking. Yes, there is something inadequate in Kant’s methodology. Hegel clears up some of this. Another beginning is made later with Husserl. But the overcoming of alienated thought begins here; the turn toward the thinking subject, which is the heart of philosophy, begins with Kant. As does its grounding as science, as knowledge. But too a word about his ‘difficulty.‘ Thinking is difficult. Philosophy is difficult. Knowing is difficult. What we novice thinkers have to gain here -- and we must put aside this silly quip about how Kant can’t write -- is a mode of real thinking. As Marguerite Young said, Style is thinking. And Kant’s tortuous syntax reflects not only teaching philosophy to speak German (which Hegel was still endeavoring to accomplish) but because also the nature of Kant’s matter, the Sache, is difficult and does not give itself lightly. Alone Kant wrote and published four different versions of the transcendental deduction of the categories, not because he didn’t know how to express himself, but because the matter itself had never previously been attempted. And here too I find it advantageous, in so far as one lends oneself to learn to think, to follow a translation which most closely mirrors the mode of thought within the German language. There is at least some nugget of truth to Heidegger’s quip that Being speaks only German and Greek. There is no easy first avenue into Kant’s work except that one has already accomplished his Copernican revolution. And to do so on one’s own is perhaps comparable to learning the calculus or elementary particle physics on one’s own. Philosophy is available to all, but it is also so easy to miss, to misrecognize philosophy as mere wisdom or opinion. But to take philosophy as real cognition, thought, knowledge, to find one’s way behind both the methods and results of religion and the natural sciences, is a real accomplishment. To find one’s way to fundamental principles from which all experience springs is no simple task.

  • kaelan
    2019-01-05 01:23

    Both frightfully obscure and logically scrupulous, Kant functions sort of like a philosophical litmus test. Many a metaphysical charlatan (Lacan, Žižek, et. al.) has aped his mystifying prose-style without any attempt to match his rigour. And meanwhile, the most provincial of the analytic camp, unduly equating "abstruseness" with "bullshit," write him off as a mere historical oddity.But the truth of the matter is that the Critique—Kant's magnum opus—constitutes one of the most inventive, meticulous and edifying works of philosophical mind-fuckery ever to be writ.In a nutshell, the Critique finds Kant arguing for the doctrine of transcendental idealism, which asserts that our knowledge of the world only extends to the phenomenal (how things appear to us), rather than the noumenal (how things exist irrespective of us). Indeed, mustn't all possible knowledge and experience first pass through the lens of our own subjectivity? (Not that everyone will agree with this claim.)That being said, Kant's view has more than its fair share of problems. For instance, the "Transcendental Aesthetic," in which he argues that all (human) experience is spatially and temporally conditioned, seems rather problematic—especially in the face of modern scientific conceptions of space and time. Even so, it would still need to be determined which of Kant's subsequent claims suffer as a result.But perhaps the largest issue facing transcendental idealism is exegetical in nature.Upon its initial publication, many readers of the Critique took it to express a particularly sophisticated version of Berkeley's so-called "mystic idealism," which led Kant to include a rather pointed rebuttal in subsequent pressings. And even though Kant takes obvious plains to differentiate logic from psychology (the Critique proceeds along the former grounds), some modern scientists have read Kant's categories as anticipating certain neurological circuits.However, one of the most important debates in Kantian scholarship has been between the dual object and dual aspect interpretations of the Critique. According to the former, Kant believed noumena and phenomena to be two related but ultimately separate types of entity, whereas the latter holds that phenomena simply constitute the perceptible "aspect" of noumena.Thus, it's not even clear what Kant's view truly is—at least in its particulars. So perhaps it'd be best to withhold any judgment regarding its ultimate truth or falsity...Yet if the Critique is so difficult, and its arguments so terribly obscure, why should we even bother with it in the first place? Whilst perusing this book—a process which took up the better part of two years—I assembled a list of reasons for why Critique deserves its elevated position within the history of Western philosophy. Here's what I came up with:(1) For taking the "negative" empiricism of Hume, which is as frightening as it is cogent, and combining it with an explanation for why the world still seems to make at least an iota of sense—i.e., finding a middle road between empiricism and rationalism.(2) For constructing a devastating critique of speculative metaphysics. (Sorry, Leibnitz.)(3) For replacing metaphysical arguments from speculative reason with metaphysical arguments from practical reason. That is, even if a metaphysical proposition is impossible to prove, it doesn't follow that we should not believe in it.(3.1) For instance, either (a) free will exists or (b) we live in a thoroughly deterministic universe. Let's say we live in a thoroughly deterministic universe, in which case all of our beliefs will be accordingly determined, and hence we would simply and inexorably believe one of these propositions or the other. But now suppose that we truly enjoy the power of choice. If we have free will but fail to recognize this fact, we'll likely also fail to take responsibility for our actions. Therefore, we should—according to the dictates of practical reason—believe in the existence of free will, even if we can't come up with any airtight theoretical proof.(4) For recognizing that all possible experience necessarily conforms to certain cognitive categories.(5) For inventing the transcendental argument, in which the existence of some entity is deduced according to the preconditions for possible experience.(6) For developing the doctrine of transcendental idealism.(7) For formulating some pretty ingenious arguments against the then prominent theological proofs; and on the way, possibly laying the groundwork for second-order logic.(8) For offering a (metalogical) account for why logic seems to be such a useful tool of inquiry, philosophical or otherwise.A word of warning to the potential reader: this behemoth requires quite a lot of background knowledge—the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley and especially Hume; the rationalism of Leibniz; and even a dash of Newton (à propos the absolutist conception of space) and Aristotle (à propos the search for ontological categories) thrown in for good measure. But for those serious about philosophy, the Critique—Guyer and Wood's top-notch translation in particular—makes for an indispensable read.

  • Maali
    2019-01-09 23:21

    قد صدق من قال : بإمكانك أن تكون مع كانط أو أن تكون ضده لكنك لا تستطيع أن تتفلسف من دونه !كتاب نقد العقل المحض ترجمة غانم هنا - الصادر عن المنظمة العربية للترجمة , في 840 ص, - للفيلسوف الالماني ايمانويل كانط .. يعتبر هذا الكتاب الكتاب الأهم في الفلسفة الحديثة نظرا للتأثير الهائل الذي احدثه, ففي الفترة التي نشر فيها هذا الكتاب سنة 1781 كان الاعتقاد السائد بأن اهم حدث تاريخي في اخر 300 سنة هو الثورة الامريكية وتأسيس الولايات المتحدة - على الاقل لدى الشعب الامريكي - الا ان كثير من مؤرخي الفلسفة وتاريخ العلوم يذبون للقول بأن الحدث الاهم في اخر 300 سنة تفريبا كان نشر ايمانويل كانط لكتابه نقد العقل المحض, والذي لا يزال أثره ممتدا حتى يومنا هذا ! فعلى هذا الكتاب تأسست الكثير من المدارس الفلسفية والاتجاهات الفكرية كالظاهراتية - الفنومينولجية - والمثالية الالمانية والمثالية المتعالية وغيرها .. ولو نظرنا الى الفترة التي سبقت نشر هذا الكتاب - الى وضع العلوم في القارة الاوروبية - لوجدنا بأن علم اللاهوت كان هو اهم العلوم في مقابل الفلسفة التي لم تكن تحظها بتلك المكانة,و مع اصدار كانط لهذا الكتاب فقد فقد علم اللاهوت تلك المكانة التي كان يحظى بها حتى انه اصبح علما ثانويا وبدأ سقوطه تدريجيا ليصل الى الحاله التي هو عليها اليوم, لا يعدو عن كونه علم اقل من ثانوي ! بالتالي فهذا الكتاب كان بمثابة نقطة تحول في تاريخ الفكر الانساني, ولذالك لم يكن من العجيب ان ينعت رجال الدين كلابهم باسم - كانط - نظرا لما احدثه من تغيير كبير على وضعهم - حيث بدأ فقدانهم لسلطته تدريجيا من سلطة مطلقة الى سلطة شكلية في ايامنا هذه -, فما الذي فعله كانط حتى يستحق مثل هذا النعت ؟ ان ابرز دور قاهم به هو انه جاء بيميتافيزيقا جديدة بين خلالها قصور العقل البشري - حينما تناول حدود المعرفة البشريه - عن التعامل مع الامور الماورائيه والتي لا يمكن اثباتها لا بالعقل المحض او حتى بالتجربة ولذالك فهي تأخذ فقط كمسلمات بدون اي دليل عقلي او امبريقي , حيث زعم كانط قائلا : انا ازعم ان اي سؤال ميتافيزقي سيخر في ذهنك فأن جوابه في هذا الكتاب ؟ لذالك ان اس فلسفة كانط كان قتل الادلة والبراهين التقليدية على وجود الله كالسببية وغيرها من الاستدلالات التقليدية ! ولذالك اطلق عليه البعض من امثال ويل ديورانت - قاتل الله - اي قاتل البراهين والاستدلالت التقليدية على وجود الله , ونلاحظ ان الالحاد بمفهومه الحديث انكار الله ظهر بشكل كبير بعد كانط - تلميذه المباشر شوبنهاور كان اول المجاهرين بهذا - , فقبل كانط كان لفظ الملحد يطلق على من ينكر النبوات او اي شيء من الشرائع المتاعرف عليها لا انكار وجود الله في ذاته فالرازي كان ملحدا ؟ لكنه لم يكن منكرا لله واقتصر انكاره على النبوات وهذا كان معنى الالحاد عموما اما بعد كانط فقد اصبح الالحاد يعبر عن مفهمومه الحديث وهو انكار الوجود - وجود الله - .. اما عن تأثير ايمانويل كانط لتبسيط الامور يمكننا القول بإن تاريخ الفلسفة برمته قبل كانط ينقسم بين مدرستين فكريتين رئيسيتين : العقلانية والتي يمكن ان ندرج تحتها اسماء مثل - بارمنديس افلاطون افلوطين وصولا الى ديكارت و لايبنتز الخ - من ناحية و المدرسة التجريبية - والتي يمكن ان ندرج تحتها اسماء مثل ارسطو و بيكون ولوك وغيرهم - من ناحية أخرى.وبحسب بعض مؤرخي الفلسفة والعلوم فإن أهم توليفة فلسفية قد تم وضعها في تاريخ الفلسفة هي التوليفة التي جاء بها كانط حين اخذ كلا من المدرستين واقتبس من كل واحده منهما حيث انتقد بعض الجوانب في كل مدرسة واقتبس الامور الايجابية في كل جانب وترتب على ذلك نشوء نهج جديد للمعرفة . وكي لا يقع في اعتقادنا ان تلك التوليفة كانت هي نهاية الفلسفة - وليس بالامكان ان يكون احسن مما كان - فإن الذي حصل ان اعمال كانط الفلسفية التي شكلت حدا فاصلا في تاريخ الفلسفة قد انبثقت عنها إما بشكل مباشر أو غير مباشر, كافة المدارس الفلسفية الحديثة التي تتناقش فيما بينها, فمنذ ايام كانط يمكننا تتبع جذور المثالية والماركسية والفلسفة الوضعية المنطقية والفلسفة الوجودية و الفينومينولوجيا - الظاهيراتية - و البراغماتية والمذهب النسبي , مما يعني عمليا ان جميع حركيات القرن التاسع عشر والقرن العشرين التي برزت منذ ايام كانط تعود جذورها الى بعض جوانب بعض ابعاد العمل الذي انشأه هذه الفيلسوف - وتحديدا في ثلاثيته النقدية الشهيرة -..ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ * من الصعب جدا اختصار هذا الكتاب العظيم في عدة اسطر لن توفيه حقه أبدا على أن الكتاب فضلا عن ذلك يحتاج للقرأه اكثر من مرة * الكتاب يتكون من 840 ص وهو يضم كتاابين او نسختين من كتاب نقد العقل المحض النسخة الاولى التي نشرت سنة 1781 والنسخة الثانية التي نشرها كانط بعد 9 سنوات مضيفا عليها بعض التعديلات الجديدة .

  • Jenny Park
    2018-12-29 02:28

    immanuel kant is by farrrrr the world's most precise philosopher... EVER! haha.. this text, like many philosophical texts out there... was really dry.. and um.. long. but there's definitely a reason why this one's regarded as one of the greatest philosophical pieces out there. so the book's premise in a nutshell... noone can argue FOR or AGAINST an afterlife/God. he also digs into the idea that our understanding of the world and our ideas are based not only on experience, but on a priori concept... it's worth a read, esp if you are the soul searching type..

  • Christopher
    2019-01-21 03:06

    Parsing this carefully is exhilarating. At least it was for me. It made me feel like my brain was growing. You may disagree with the system, but the argument is a marvel. Required reading.

  • Erik Graff
    2018-12-24 00:23

    With adolescence came nihilistic thoughts of suicide. The reasoning was simple. The public schools and an early interest in the sciences had led me to believe that we are part of an ordered universe, the parts of which are finite, the rules of which are determinable. Like an eighteenth century philosophe, I believed the hypothesis of a creative entity outside of the system, a deity, to be unnecessary. In principle, everything was determined, the past seminally containing all of the future. In principle, a perfect description would be possible given enough time. Basically, without knowing it, I was a logical atomist. Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus would have been deadly at this time.The intellectual problem which arose from this belief system had an emotional basis, viz. I was unhappy with the way things were. Entering high school at age fifteen, I was 4'11", pimply and myopic. I had a temporary false tooth until such time as my head finished growing. I had a scar near the navel from a messy surgery in infancy. I was, if one looked closely, ugly. No girl would ever have me on the basis of appearances. Having no real friends, my family having moved four years previous, the only hope of love was to develop virtues of character by trying to be good and by studying very hard so as to be knowledgeable.Becoming knowledgeable was a clear enough project, but being good was increasingly uncertain. I understood a bunch of ways that people talked about ethical goodness and found some of them preferable to others. I liked Gandhi's kind of goodness, "The Sermon on the Mount", the Civil Rights and Anti-War movements, but, obviously, a lot of other people hadn't or didn't. Living in a town which had just been swept by Goldwater's campaign, I had enough arguments about rights and wrongs to suspect that the moral sense was like the sense of taste, individual, based on genetic nature and social nurture. I didn't have irrefutable arguments to compel others to my sense of the good--nor did they have such arguments to compel me.Topping off the despair was the abiding belief that everything was determined, that anything I might accomplish was foreordained. It was a fact that I was, by prevailing standards, unattractive. Well, I had little control of that. It might become a fact that I would be very knowledgeable and even approbatively seen as a very "good" person by adjusting to conventional ethical standards. But that wouldn't have made me worthy of love if it were just the outcome of a concatenation determined events, if my sense of free agency were but an illusion. So, why bother? I didn't know it at the time, I didn't even have the word for it, but my beliefs about the universe were metaphysical. The beliefs that there is (a) a universe that is (b) finite and (c) completely ordered were not based on evidence. They were heuristic assumptions conducive to drawing pictures of an ordered cosmos, assumptions which had tended to confirm themselves by their application in the sciences.Kant convinced me of that. It was a conversion experience which followed upon a great deal of study, not only of his work, but also of the works of others such as Aristotle and Hume upon which his own thinking was substantially based. I'd been exposed to this basically simple idea before through such writers as Nietzsche, but not compellingly.Now, a much wiser person, I no longer think nihilistically that suicide is consequent upon enlightenment. Now I just think about good reasons for killing myself. The rest of you should get to reading Kant or preparing to do so.

  • أحمد
    2019-01-09 22:24

    لفترة طويلة من حياتي كنت معجبا بالعقلانية و ميالا لها حتي قرأت هذا الكتاب من اول سطر و كانط بلغة رائعة و منطق بسيط جدا يدخل مباشرة في الموضوع و يناقش محدودية العقل من اوجه مختلفة اوضح الكتاب نقاط الضعف في العقلانية و فندها ووضع الفلسفة وقتها في مأزقفبعد ان ادعت الفلسفة وقتها (نهاية الاسئلة) و الادراك التام اعادها نقد كانط مرة اخري الي حيرة التساؤل عن الاسئلة الاساسية

  • Saleh MoonWalker
    2019-01-06 05:29

    Onvan : Critique of Pure Reason - Nevisande : Immanuel Kant - ISBN : 521657296 - ISBN13 : 9780521657297 - Dar 796 Safhe - Saal e Chap : 1781

  • Wided Nems
    2019-01-05 05:23

    في كتابه نقد العقل الخالص , يحاول ايمانويل كانت أن يحسم الصراع الفلسفي المطروح في نظرية الابستيمولوجيا عن مصدر المدركات _من خلال البرهنة على مدى تكامل الحدوس الحسيّة والأفاهيم العقلية المحضة في عملية البناء المعرفي , متجاوزًا كل التفسيرات الدوغمائية السابقة عند العقلانيين أو الحسيين على حد سواء وإذا كان ايمانويل كانت يبرهن على العلاقة التفاعلية بين الملكتين الحسية الامبيرية والافاهيم الفاهمية المحضة , فإنه يجيبنا عن الإشكال : كيف نصل إلى المعرفة؟ ليتجاوزه إلى تساؤل جوهري آخر يحتاج إلى الحسم في إشكالاته هو : ماذا يمكننا أن نعرف ؟ أو ماهي حدود معارفنا ؟ فإذا كانت معرفة ظاهرات الأشياء_فينومينا_ ممكنة , فإن العقل المحض في مقابل ذلك عاجز عن ادراك كنهها_نومينا nauméne _أي الشيء في ذاته , وهذا التسليم بحدود معيّنة للعقل للخالص يعجز في النهاية عن تجاوزها , هو في ذات الوقت خطوة أساسية في اتجاه ميتافيزيقيا قادرة على أن تقوم كعلم! _على حد تعبير كانت_, من خلال تقويض المزاعم التي تدّعي بثقة أن في إمكانها إثبات قضايا ميتافيزيقية أنطولوجية هي في الواقع تتجاوز حدود العقل , ومن ثم غير ممكنة الإثبات أو النفي مادامت تركن إلى حجج عقلية محضة _خارج حقل التجربة"يمكن عدّ نقد العقل المحض بمثابة المحكمة الحقيقية لكل نزاعاته , لأنه ليس معنيّا في النزاعات من حيث تدور على الموضوعات مباشرة بل أنه مهيأ لتعيين حقوق العقل بعامة ..وهكذا ترغمنا نزاعات العقل التي لا تنتهي على أن نبحث أخيرا عن السكينة والطمأنينة في نقدٍ للعقل نفسه"

  • Anthony
    2019-01-05 02:19

    I'm trying to decide whether or not I get it.Sometimes I think I have just understood a passage of Kant only to discover that I have actually just beenhaving my own thoughtspertaining to something or other in the content of the passage, and this is sometimes rewarding, but it is nevertheless not exactly what I intended to accomplish.Say Kant is writing about perception or being, and say I misunderstand Kant-- what exactly happens when I misunderstand Kant, and by misunderstanding him, discover something I believe to be true about perception or being? How different is this from understanding Kant properly? Isn't Kant himself some kind of Ding-an-sich, whom I can not understand directly but only through my own understanding of him?My poor Kant is frustrated for having been read in the manner I have been reading him.

  • Giorgi
    2019-01-23 04:22

    how to review CPR? there are various ways of reviewing books, according to the dogmatic method of review our writings deal to the book exactly as it is, that Kant calls dogmatic method when one claims that he fully explored every component of book and has absolute knowledge of it.tradition of dogmatic reviews is dominated in western tradition, there is also a sceptical claims such David Hume's, who denied every possibility of knowing book, that method of writing is so dangerous because it denied of every possible knowledge about books.instead of this two radical school of writing there is critical assessment, which claims that knowing books is always determined, each cease of readers cognitive faculties and his pure understating of text.that means that we know book as phenomena as it is presented to us and it always correspond of our general abilities of judging and evaluating it, and that the book as it is itself is noumenal. so this reading always deals to readers phenomenal world his cognitive capacities, categories of pure understanding and logic. reviewing/reading goes like this - we have first steps of pure intuition are reading words and sentences, they aren't empirical forms of our understanding as lock holds it, but minds way of knowing texts. following intuition there is logic, what is to say mind has pure options of judging and each reading deals to phenomena of understanding books by reading from his point of view, since pure intuition gives us contents by words and sentences, logic of pure judging deals that words and sentences. categories of judging is twelve and they make full explore of our knowledge, categories are good excellent not bad and not as it presented in Goodreads this method of reviewing there aren't place for metaphysical question, such as CPR is the greatest book in philosophy,there are not any mistakes in CPR, and CPR has greatest values for us.we have no ability to answer that questions,either or, all similar assertions are logic of illusion in which each statement either it is greatest book or it isn't are equally valid.example: thesis CPR is the greatest book, it has most complicated structure of studying our reasoning and principles of it's working so that make the books most cool.antithesis CPR is dull book Kant was living before three centuries ago, so we no longer need it.synthesis: CPR is great, but a little bit boring book.

  • Crito
    2019-01-13 05:20

    It's recommended to have at least read Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and Hume before reading this. And since reading this is a skeleton key of sorts to all philosophy since Kant, he's in this really interesting point between two eras of philosophy. Some of what makes him hard to follow at first is that which defines his approach to philosophy, which is intensely meticulous and methodical, yet laid out plainly. And after you start appreciating his ideas and style, you start getting not only how brilliant he is, but also how humble and sincere he is. Sure he'll rip someone's philosophy to shreds it's but in the interest of the advancement of reason, and he'll even treat layman's ideas with as much seriousness as he treats fellow philosophers. He's in it just to do his part and that's admirable (and arguably necessary) in a philosopher. I read the Müller translation and despite the fact that it's a dated translation, it doesn't read like it at all. I don't know German and I'm no Kant expert but I feel like it's a good translation.

  • Erik
    2018-12-27 01:29

    My advice for anyone beginning the K.d.r.V. is to maintain your independence of judgment. Don't get buried in the terminology, the secondary literature or your own obsessions or reasons for approaching the book. Try to think through what Kant is saying and bring before your mind all of the possibilities for what he could mean, then eliminate them one by one, until you have arrived at your reading of the Kritik. I would encourage doing Leibniz and the Pre-Critical writings first, otherwise you will not understand where Kant is coming from, or what he took to be the central problems of philosophy. I would also not approach this with an axe to grind, nor through Kant worship and dogmatic immersion in Kantianese. Having worked hard on this book, I can only say that I think I know what it means, I think some of it is profoundly right and some of it is profoundly wrong, but every time I teach it I still discover something new, or something I had overlooked. I am still learning from it. That is the definition of a classic.

  • Yann
    2019-01-02 05:25

    Un renard affamé, voyant des grappes de raisin pendre à une treille, voulut les attraper ; mais ne pouvant y parvenir, il s’éloigna en se disant à lui-même : « ils sont trop verts ». Pareillement, certains hommes, ne pouvant mener à bien leurs affaires en raison de leurs capacités en accusent les circonstances.J’ai été longtemps comme le renard d’Esope, vis-à-vis de la Critique de la Raison Pure de Kant, principalement rebuté par l’obscurité du texte lorsqu’il m’arrivait de le feuilleter. En effet, la lecture de Kant est difficile et exigeante pour le lecteur : à l’inverse des philosophes anglais qui mettent tout en œuvre pour rendre clair et évidentes leurs idées, en recourant au définitions, au langage commun et aux exemples, Kant évite les définitions, utilise un jargon particulier, et a très peu recours aux exemples : c’est un parti pris annoncé dès l’introduction, de vouloir rebuter le vulgaire et forcer le lecteur à la réflexion. D’un côté, je regrette ce parti pris, car il rend l’auteur suspect de vouloir couvrir de fumée des sophismes, de flatter ce qui serait une élite de lecteurs qui aurait fait l’effort de le suivre (et on aime mieux ce qui nous a couté de la peine), mais d’un autre côté, force est d’admettre que Kant ne choisis son vocabulaire qu’avec de bonnes raisons, en se rapprochant du grec et du latin. Par exemple, en grec, le verbe moyen αἰσθάνομαι signifie percevoir par les sens, mais aussi comprendre et apprendre : il a donné l’adjectif esthétique en français (und ästhetik auf Deutsch), qui est associé à l’idée de beauté. Pour Kant, qui se rapproche du sens grec original, il désigne les formes qui permettent « a priori » de percevoir les sensations : l’espace et le temps. L’étude des langues mortes et le goût de l’étymologie a été d’un grand secours. Un autre avantage que j’ai tiré de cette lecture est qu’elle m’a forcé à combler mes lacunes, en allant chercher systématiquement chercher dans les auteurs cités si leurs idées n’étaient pas trahies ou présentées de manière partielles : j’ai donc relu le Thééthète de Platon (je me suis amusé à retrouver des arguments, comme le "7+5=12". Synthétique? Non, analytique, comme tous les jugements mathématiques, qui par analyse, réduit les propositions à des identités), des passages de Locke et de Hume, le Prosologion de Anselme de Cantorbery, et découvert Victor Cousin, Leibniz et ses nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, et surtout Berkeley. Tout ceci a allongé ma lecture sur presque plus de neuf mois.A l’origine, après avoir lu l’Essai sur l’Entendement Humain de Locke, et avoir été très favorablement impressionné, je n’ai pas résisté à la volonté d'éprouver au feu de la critique les vues que cet auteur m’avait fait embrasser. Comme son prédécesseur Anglais, le but de Kant dans cet ouvrage est de déterminer les limites de l’étendue des connaissances à laquelle la raison peut prétendre. D’emblée, ils diffèrent radicalement sur un point central : le rôle que joue la sensation dans l’acquisition du savoir. Le premier point abordé par Locke est la critique des idées innées, qu’il réfute, et qui lui sert de fondement pour ne donner à l’ensemble de nos connaissances qu’une origine sensible, reprenant d’Aristote l’image de la « page blanche ». Ces sensations ne sont pas limités pour Locke à nos cinq sens naturels, mais comprennent également tout ce qu’en fait notre sens interne, toutes les combinaisons des phénomènes (du grec φαίνω, faire briller, paraître) que peuvent créer les facultés de notre entendement à partir de ces perceptions: l’attention, la mémoire, l’imagination, les passions, la vivacité, l’intelligence (Kant parle de jugements synthétiques), le discernement (Kant parle de jugements analytiques), la volonté pour citer les principales. Cette position permet à Locke de se libérer des querelles scolastiques, de rejeter les principes prétendument innés, et surtout de résoudre très élégamment la question du libre arbitre, en montrant que la proposition «la volonté est libre » n’a pas plus de sens que d’affirmer que la vertu est bleue ou carrée : le libre-arbitre n'est en rien incompatible avec le déterminisme, au contraire. Il rejette également toute la métaphysique hors du champ d’investigation possible de la raison.Kant réfute le fait que les sensations soient l’unique source des objets qui intéressent la raison, en introduisant une distinction particulière : ce qui est « a priori » ou « pur » ou « transcendant » qualifie pour lui l’ensemble des concepts (il parle d'intuitions) que la raison renferme sans que les sensations en soient à l’origine, et « a posteriori », « non pur » et « immanent », ce qui au contraire est issu des sens. C’est le sujet de l’esthétique transcendantale. Sans conteste, c’est la partie qu’il m’a été la plus difficile à admettre, car en effet il donne pour exemple de forme « a priori » de la sensibilité, l’espace, le temps et les mathématiques. Pour ces trois exemples, il m’est impossible d’accorder à Kant qu’ils ne tirent origine de la sensibilité, mais il est tellement difficile d’abstraire tout ce que nous avons reçu par les sens (par exemple, d’où vient l’instinct ?), que l’on pourrait admettre théoriquement qu’il pourrait y avoir de tels concepts : cela ne gêne pas pour suivre la suite de son raisonnement, car comme un coup de théâtre, il établit finalement que cette esthétique transcendantale ne nous est d'aucune aide pour comprendre le monde, sans l'aide des phénomènes, tout en étant indispensable. Mince !Kant introduit ensuite ce que Locke nommait relations, un effet de l’intelligence, faculté de lier les concepts. Les nommant catégories pures, il les rejette hors des notions déduites de l’expérience sensible dans partie traitant de l’analytique transcendantale. J’aurais tendance à considérer ces catégories comme inhérentes à la faculté de l’entendement nommée intelligence (capacité à lier des concepts par des relations/catégories), mais ce n’est peut-être qu’une querelle de mot, et il n’empêche pas de suivre Kant dans le chemin qu’il trace. Il semble que tout ceci a été établi pour résoudre les conséquences apparemment inacceptables pour Kant du scepticisme de Hume, qu'il juge issu de l'empirisme de Locke. (note 1 p.106). Pour objection, les jugements mathématiques sont analytiques, et non synthétiques, et les théories scientifiques physiques évoluent régulièrement : ce n'est pas un drame. Il construit néanmoins une belle théorie pour résoudre cette difficulté. J'ai été touché par l'idéal de Kant de liberté, de tolérance qui professe à l'égard des différentes théories que l'esprit peut conjecturer, pour expliquer ce qui ne peut l'être, dans ses Antinomies. Quelle autre attitude adopter ? Ceux qui ne se rallient pas à nos opinions blessent notre amour-propre, mais ce dernier est soulagé si au fond, nous nous considérons comme aussi ignorant qu'eux. J'ai aussi aimé son agnosticisme raisonnable, et son ingénieux recours au pragmatisme pour décider d'adopter tel ou tel doctrine. Une belle idée, qui veut établir la paix entre les écoles, mais il s'en faut de beaucoup qu'il soit entendu et suivi. C’est Victor Cousin, fondateur de l’enseignement philosophique en France, et d’un courant nommé éclectisme qui a popularisé la pensée de Kant. Son cours reprend l’histoire de philosophie de Kant : idéalisme, empirisme, scepticisme, auquel il adjoint le mysticisme comme dernier moment d’un cycle qui se répète dans toutes les civilisations : un peu comme le cycle des gouvernements exposé par Hérodote dans son Enquête : Aristocratie, Démocratie, Royauté. Je suis un peu gêné par cette approche qui conduit, selon mon sentiment, à un relativisme spécieux, et à relire les productions philosophiques passées de manière à les distribuer systématiquement dans des « cases ». Autorise-t-elle à attribuer à telle ou telle doctrine le qualificatif infamant pour les philosophes de "dogmatique" ? Lequel ne l'est pas ? Il faut bien adopter des hypothèses, affirmer quelque chose ou bien se taire.Au final, Kant propose une théorie ingénieuse, qui quoique reposant sur des principes fort discutables, possède une grande cohérence. La hauteur de ses vues, sa rigueur, son acribie, son honnête probité, la beauté de ses objectifs, la masse de travail intellectuelle accomplie force le respect et même l'admiration, quoique je regrette son parti pris de trop serrer ses raisonnements au point de les rendre souvent obscurs. Sa lecture est très stimulante; elle requiert de l'attention et force le lecteur à penser, chercher les sources citées, vérifier le sens et l'étymologie des mots (substance, concept, idée, jugement, etc...), juger, et c'est un passe temps très agréable de stimuler son esprit en sa compagnie.

  • Pierre E. Loignon
    2018-12-30 00:06

    Au lieu de commencer à philosopher en lisant les auteurs de notre siècle afin d'obtenir du succès en faisant de beaux papiers à la mode, Karl Jaspers, dans son Introduction à la philosophie, conseillait aux néophytes d’aller d’abord lire Platon et Kant. Bien que la lecture de Kant sera grandement facilité par celle de Leibniz et de Hume, mais aussi d'Aristote, de Descartes, de Spinoza, de Berkeley et de Locke, je souscris assez bien à l'opinion de Jaspers. Et, de fait, tous les philosophes vraiment marquants se réfèrent inévitablement à Platon et à Kant. Après avoir tout lu Platon, je me suis donc lancé dans Kant en commençant avec sa Critique de la raison pure. Depuis, je l'ai lue trois fois, d'un couvert à l'autre, en plus de plusieurs lectures partielles pour divers travaux, sans compter que j'ai à peu près tout lu les autres livres qu'il a écrits. Il n'y a que l'Opus postumum et la Métaphysique des moeurs que je n'ai pas encore trouvé l'occasion de lire parmi ses oeuvres principales. Bref, j'ai lu beaucoup Kant, beaucoup sur Kant et je suis loin d'avoir d'en avoir fini avec lui. C’est pour moi un des plus grand philosophes de tous les temps et surtout le philosophe par excellence de la moralité.La Critique de la raison pure ne se donne pas gratuitement. Elle exige, pour être compréhensible par son lecteur, que ce dernier dispose d’une actualité existentielle morale ainsi que de la capacité corollaire d’abstraction philosophique. Il pourra alors se prêter à une véritable expérience philosophique d’orientation de l’éclairement des clôtures et ouvertures de l’esprit humain. La position critique qu’il nous présente ici me semble toujours être la position par excellence pour philosopher, mais aussi pour vivre sa foi (quelle soit politique, artistique, morale ou religieuse) et pour évoluer dans le monde de la science, tout en demeurant sur le terrain d’une possible communication ouverte avec l’autre.Le passage qui m’a donné le plus de mal, c’est le saut qu’il nous faut faire lorsque se présente, brusquement, sa table des catégories. Kant ne tente même pas d'en faire la déduction. Ce ne sont toutefois pas des dogmes pour autant, mais des concepts hypothétiques dont il faut évaluer l’utilité et l’exhaustivité afin d’évaluer si l'on peut trouver mieux avant de les rejeter. Comme toujours avec les concepts métaphysiques, chez Kant, ce sont des noumènes au sens négatifs, c’est-à-dire des postulats et non des réalités ontologiques.Je ne vais pas aborder chaque détail pour ne pas abuser de la patience des lecteurs et lectrices de ce commentaire, mais pour aider quiconque aimerait s’y initier, je conseille fortement de commencer par lire la partie sur les Antinomies de la raison pure. Il s’agit de la première section que Kant a écrite et tous les problèmes qu’il aborde dans les sections précédentes et subséquentes cherchent à expliquer comment il a trouvé ces solutions aux Antinomies et ce qui en découle.

  • Archetech
    2019-01-12 04:31

    This is a great work. Nearly all philosophy after has been a reaction to it or an outgrowth from it. One cannot tell if this is because Kant was truly so influential or because he saw with such depth and unity the fruitful course philosophy would take. The language can be daunting and exhausting. It is, however, precise and if one can follow the concepts in it, it works almost like a dry poetry that seems to lay bare the foundations of knowledge and experience. It is such a chore to wade through though, one ought to use a companion book that explains the text to stay on course. If understanding truth and knowledge is important to you, the concepts, in their original form, as well as Kant's language and thought is well worth the considerable work it takes to experience. It will provide a basis for understanding much of the context of modern philosophy in its analytic, cognitive, and continental forms. I know of no other work that is true of.Though it was prescient in the footing it found for philosophy, don't expect it to compare to more modern thought in terms of thoroughness and precision. It is perhaps the greatest and most relevant work of philosophy that sought to create an all-encompassing system. Such ambitions have properly been abandoned for greater, deeper and more precise understanding. Yet, for that very reason, it can serve as a solid foundation to appreciate modern thought as more than vague abstraction or nitpicking chatter.

  • mohab samir
    2019-01-12 04:12

    أن تعرف حدود عقلك أو جغرافيته أو فسيولوجياه . هو أهم ما يمكن أن تفكر فيه من الأمور ولكن للأسف قلما نجد من يبحث فى تلك المعرفة .ولكم فوجئت وسعدت بمعرفتى بالنقد الكانطى للعقل المحض . سعدت أن هناك من تطوع لوضع هذا المنهج العقلى للمعرفة الإنسانيه المحايدة والبعيدة عن كل تطرف فى محاولاتنا المعرفية فللعقل البشرى غرور يدفعه الى التسليم بواقعية ما ليس له به علم وله احيانا من الضعف ما يجعله ينكر إمكان آية معرفة ودائما وأبداً من اصعب الامور على الإنسان أن يسير فى خط مستقيم متوسط بين طرفى نقيض خصوصا إذا تعلق الأمر بمسألة هى على هذا القدر من الحساسية والصعوبة . وهذا ما فوجئت به أن هناك من قام بوضع هذا المنهج هو العظيم كانط ولكنى أؤمن ان هناك نقدا قابلا للقراءة لهذا المنهج وهو ما يجب ان نبحث عنه بعد إنتهائنا من أبحاث كانط الفلسفية .والآن إلى نقد العقل العملى .

  • Calandrino_Tozzetti
    2019-01-17 04:04

    TITOLO: Ideale sotto l'ombrellone del SapereNon me lo sarei mai aspettato, davvero.Una lettura agile e scoppiettante, la cui scorrevolezza sorprende ancora oggi, grazie anche alla mirabile curatela gentiliana.Perfetto per una vacanza nella quale si abbisogna di un completo relax abbinato a una molleggiata ginnastica filosofica.Divorato proprio questa estate nella ridente Gatteo a Mare, intervallato a pagine e pagine di Settimana Enigmistica svolte assieme alla mia signora: tra un bagno, un trentasette orizzontale e una piadina al prosciutto, squacquerone e imperativo categorico.

  • C
    2019-01-16 00:19

    Sheer genius alone is why this book deserves five stars, from all readers. I mean seriously, look at the giant noggin on the cover of the book. It's comparable only to Lenin.That said, in a letter to a friend, Kant confessed that this book was the culmination of twelve years of deep thought, and only five to six months of rapid writing with “no concern” for the readers’ leisure. I don’t think it’s too presumptuous to state, that the deeper one delves into the book, the murkier the writing becomes.Kant marks the culmination of the return to the subject in philosophy, and he also marks the break between analytic and continental thought. After the Catholic Church ruined philosophy, from Aristotle to Descartes (around 2,000 years!), Descartes was bold enough to attempt to erect a philosophical theory of knowledge contingent upon the certainties of the subject (the cogito). Descartes’ attempts were fairly messy after the cogito, and the empiricist (Locke and Hume) pounced on him. None of these thinkers were capable of erecting a sturdy foundation for epistemology, let alone metaphysics, ontology, ethics, etc. As Kant informs us in this book, Hume awoke him from his slumber, and he attempted a task comparable only to Plato, Marx, and Hegel. He attempted to erect an entire systemic philosophy.* The Critique of Pure Reason is Kant’s epistemological and metaphysical work. Well, more of a critique of metaphysics, in hopes to put the train back on the rails. A train that – when reading Leibniz – is clearly loose, on fire, and heading for a village of small children. In order to reorient our entire frame of thought, Kant conducts what he calls the philosophical Copernican revolution. Instead of worrying about how external objects impact our senses, and how they are shaped in our mind, he inverts centuries of philosophy in what is a rather facile, but ingenious move. Let us instead delve into the question of how the subjects mind is preformed to impose forms upon the objective world. He conducts this revolutionary twist in the Transcendental Analytic (which is the most exciting chapter in the text). Instead of seeing space and time as things we perceive, Kant views space and time as “forms of intuition,” that is, forms we impose upon the outer world. What I’ve just said is basically Kant 101, the first thing you’ll learn about Kant on Wikipedia, an intro book, or any basic philosophy course. Reason being, the rest of the book gets really hairy, really confusing, and really jumbled, really fast. As Kant begins to deduce the categories of our mind, and the schematic relationship between our reason, and judgment, to the objects as perceived in intuition, he leaves himself open to many critiques, and interpretations. These contentions are not modern; Kant had to publish a whole other book (The Prolegomena), a summarized version of his work, just to clarify the most important aspects of The Critique of Pure Reason.At the end of this book, the reader is left with a problem that begins in Kant, and has yet to end. Do I go on to read the rest of his works, and explore his entire system, as a system, or do I go on to read something else, and pick out bits and pieces from this book that I fine useful, and discard others (albeit they may be accounted for in the larger system)? Generally, the analytic thinker will do the latter and the continental thinker the former. Of course, the horror begins once we remain true to Kant’s system. The continental thinker now realizes we must understand all subsequent replies, and rebuttals, to Kant, in their entire system too. Thus marks the period of German Idealism, through Marxism, to various schools of French Philosophy. We must erect whole systems of knowledge. Or, we can take the analytic approach, and blast away like a rabid hobo with a shot gun, seeing wisdom in whatever hits a mark, and ignoring all the debris, blood (imperialism), and wasted shells.I want to make one last trivial point. The Penguin edition biography of Kant, found in the introduction, is worth the price of the book alone. Kant was notoriously known for being a boring man, and so consistent, that someone could set their watch by his walking schedule. This is true, but Christ, this biography will have any reader in tears of laughter.* Something only Marx succeeded in, yeah I said it, and if you’ve been following my reviews, you knew I’d say it too!

  •  Δx Δp ≥ ½ ħ
    2019-01-19 22:26

    I thank God for sending Kant to the world, and for everything Kant had brought into the world. It's impossible to imagine what the world is like without him. Kant is not just a hero. He's a prophet of the new age; age of reason.Kant was one of the first philosophers who think about the very process of thinking. He showed us how the human mind and cognitive structure were set up such that we know anything at all. Kant also postulated a different way of understanding reality: Reality is not only perceived by us, but that our perception, in a sense, creates reality, because our mind structures the way we understand and perceive reality. I know, you need an aspirin. So do I.

  • Geoff
    2019-01-15 05:30

    Well shitballs. Manny's frequent tantalizing updates, pretty much Nathan's entire existence on this site, and Žižek's constant referring back to it have convinced me that this is an unavoidable book. So a copy is now in my hands.

  • Anti-Climacus
    2019-01-18 03:27

    Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind.This lays the foundation and is the premise for Immanuel Kant's Magnum Opus, the Critique of Pure Reason, where he demonstrates how human knowledge is created. The mind needs the things of the real world to be arranged into categories, otherwise all perceptions would be unintelligible. For Kant there is no thought disconnected of the world, no matter how sublime they may be, they are at all times manipulating or abstracting things from our mental representation of the real world, nothing like another reality, or a world of ideas (as in Plato), also there is no perception of anything in the world that is not shaped by mental concepts. Intuition and concepts are the elements of our whole cognition, so neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way, nor intuition without concepts can produce cognition. In order to constitute objectively valid judgments, intuitions and concepts are cognitively complementary, and semantically interdependent.What happened in Kant's time is that there were two great philosophical schools, the rationalist, and the empiricist, the statement "Thoughts without content are empty; Intuitions without concepts are blind" is Kant's critique for an epistemological reformulation. He says that on the basis of empiricism we may have only gross facts and more gross facts, but no systematic relations between them. At the base of rationalism we would have only order, but it would merely be the idea of ​​order without any organization of facts.From this idea Immanuel Kant makes the attempt to fuse the seemingly opposing ideas of empiricism and rationalism. He sums up these views by claiming that empiricism was right in speaking of experience in the form of sensory experience, which is essential to knowledge, but the rationalists were right to say that the rational structures of the mind make the understanding of sensory perceptions possible by imposing pure intuitions of time and space, and the categories of {quantity: unity, plurality, and totality}, {quality: reality, negation, limitation}, {relation: inheritance and subsistence, causality and dependence, and reciprocity}, {modality: possibility and impossibility, existence and nonexistence, necessity and contingency}.Without these structures experience would not be possible. We have an experience with the world outside of us as spatial and temporal, not because the world has these qualities, but because we impose spatiality and temporality on the intuitions we have in the mind.In this sense Kant's philosophy is called the Copernican revolution, instead of the world somehow imposing the understanding in our minds, our minds impose our knowledge of the world - our minds make the form of the world we perceive.However, it is not the world itself that we perceive, that is beyond our perception; what we perceive is the world of phenomenon, the reality behind the world of noumena is forever hidden from us.Kant believed that statements about the world can be both synthetic, that can tell us something of the world that is not contained in its own terms (e.g. blue shirt, rotten banana.), and a priori (can be known without prior experience). The example he uses is 7 + 5 = 12, there is nothing in the concept of 7 or 5 that contains the concept of 12, in which case all mathematical judgments are, without exception, synthetic, moreover it is knowledge of pure reason, therefore a priori. This is Kant's refutation to David Hume who denied this possibility.Kant also thought that science could come to synthetic statements a priori. He said the statement "In all changes in the physical world the amount of matter remains the same." would be an example of this. In the concept of matter, the permanence would not be thought of, but the presence of matter in the space it fills. Thinking that matter is permanent is not the same thing as thinking women are females, or that tigers are animals. When we judge that matter is permanent, it goes beyond the concept of matter and adds to it something that has not been observed in it. Therefore the proposition is not analytic (statement that contains the term itself), but synthetic; and it is still a priori thought. Another example of a priori synthetic statement that Kant uses is "When one body collides with another, action and reaction must always be equal." The idea of ​​a priori synthetic is extremely significant for the entire philosophy of Kant, it makes room for metaphysics and also creates the essential bridge between rationalist and empiricist epistemology.

  • Taymaz Azimi
    2018-12-30 23:25

    Finally! No... I have not 'actually' finished it. I finished 'Transcendental Doctrine of Elements,' which is what we generally talk about, when we talk about Critique of Pure Reason.Well, this book is extraordinary. During the last 4 months it has been constantly impacting my mind, even in a very personal and daily levels. I would say this book is the most influential text I have ever read in my. But it doesn't mean that I necessarily agree with all presuppositions and conclusions of it.There are some fundamental problems which I don't think I should discuss them here (since they are purely philosophical and Good Reads is not a philosophy forum). However there is a minor problem with this book which can be quite crucial to mention here. Critique of Pure Reason is not only difficult and even obscure in its purest philosophical form, but also is a dreadful peace of literature. It is really difficult to understand every single sentence; I had to read every page at least three times to get a vague picture of what Kant tries to say and I don't think it is a translation problem. I have tried different translations and I've found Guyer & Wood the best. The problem is the way Kant wrote the book. It is almost impossible to understand this text without secondary literature. I was lucky to read it with an infamous Kantian philosopher in my university.What I can recommend is to read this book alongside with Norman Kemp Smith's commentary or the Routledge Guide book by Sebastian Gardner.

  • Gottfried Sam
    2019-01-11 23:28

    Kant is systematic, thorough. I like his way of writing. He is intense, And dense, part of the reasons is because of concepts, definitions. However, I do not think he is the most difficult writer. The brilliant, deepest thinker so far I know is Jonathan Edwards. Kant is crucial to modern Philosophy, definitely worth reading his piece if you enjoy Philosophy. The important things I learnt from this book was that, Knowledge we gain is systematized through our senses. Yes, our knowledge starts from experience but Kant does not claim that every knowledge must be from experience alone or through reason alone. He calls his system transcendental knowledge, which does not mean beyond our experience but it means knowledge which both synthetical and a priori. Imagine you are wearing a blue glasses, And looking at the world. The world will be blue through your eyes, which you will never get to find out. Therefore, we are unable to completely understand the world. He classifies these as Noumena and Phenomena. Noumena is the reality, the thing itself and Phenomena is the appearance. Space and time constitute as a foundation for everything. His writings on cosmological, ontological arguments were impressive and makes me think more. "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" - Kant